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INSURANCE LAW
J. Price Collins *
Ashley E. Frizzell**
I. INSURER'S RIGHT OF REIMBURSEMENT
N probably the most anticipated insurance decision of this Survey
period, Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Frank's Casing
Crew & Rental Tools, Inc., the Texas Supreme Court revisited the
issue of whether an insurer is entitled to reimbursement from its insured
for amounts it paid to settle third-party claims against the insured when it
is subsequently determined that those claims are not covered.1 The court
first addressed this issue in 2000 in Matagorda County, holding that
"when coverage is disputed and the insurer is presented with a reasonable
settlement demand within policy limits, the insurer may fund the settle-
ment and seek reimbursement only if it obtains the insured's clear and
unequivocal consent to the settlement and the insurer's right to seek
reimbursement. "2
While not expressly overruling Matagorda County, the Frank's Casing
decision clearly expanded the insurer's right of reimbursement:
To the extent Matagorda County indicated that the only circum-
stances under which an insurer may obtain reimbursement from an
insured for settlement payments when there is no coverage is when
there is an express agreement that there is a right to seek reimburse-
ment, we clarify that there are additional circumstances that will give
rise to a right of reimbursement. 3
Such additional circumstances include: (1) when an insured has de-
manded that its insurer accept a settlement offer that is within policy lim-
its, or (2) when an insured expressly agrees that the settlement offer
should be accepted. In these situations, the insurer is entitled to reim-
bursement "if it has timely asserted its reservation of rights, notified the
insured it intends to seek reimbursement, and paid to settle claims that
were not covered." 4
* B.M., Baylor University; J.D., Baylor School of Law. Partner, Wilson, Elser, Mos-
kowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP.
** B.A., Southern Methodist University; J.D., Southern Methodist University School
of Law. Associate, Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker LLP.
1. No. 02-0730, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 418, at *1 (Tex. May 27, 2005).
2. Tex. Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk Mgmt. Pool v. Matagorda County, 52
S.W.3d 128, 135 (Tex. 2000).
3. Frank's Casing, 2005 Tex. LEXIS 418, at *23-24 (emphasis in original).
4. Id. at *11.
1379
SMU LAW REVIEW
As the basis for its determination, the court explained that "once an
insured asserts that a settlement offer has triggered a Stowers duty, and
the insurer then accepts that settlement offer or a lower one, the insured
is estopped from asserting that the settlement is too financially burden-
some for the insured to bear if it turns out the claims are not covered."'5
This is because the reasonableness of a settlement offer is judged objec-
tively by an assessment of the insured's potential liability, not by whether
the insured has assets to pay a judgment or whether the limits of insur-
ance coverage greatly exceed the potential damages for which the insured
may be liable.6 As the court explained, "When there is a coverage dis-
pute and an insured demands that its insurer accept a settlement offer
within policy limits, the insured is deemed to have viewed the settlement
offer as a reasonable one. If the offer is one that a reasonable insurer
should accept, it is one that a reasonable insured should accept if there is
no coverage."'7
The court emphasized that insurance coverage should not be created
merely because an insured could not afford to pay a judgment or fund a
settlement demand. Rather, the insurer should be entitled to settle with
the injured third party for an amount that the insured has agreed is rea-
sonable and to seek recoupment from the insured if the claims were not
covered. This does not affect the position of the insured, as it is in the
same situation that it would have been in without insurance. The only
difference is that the insured now owes money to the insurer rather than
the injured third party. Therefore, requiring an insured to reimburse its
insurer for settlement payments if it is later determined that there was no
coverage does not prejudice the insured.8 The court determined that,
under these circumstances, an agreement to reimburse the insurer is im-
plied in law and quasi-contractual. 9 Consequently, the court concluded
that the insurers were entitled to reimbursement and remanded the case
to the trial court to enter judgment in favor of the insurers.10
Notably, only three of the justices who were on the court when Mata-
gorda County was decided remained on the court when Frank's Casing
was decided-Justice Owen, Justice Hecht, and Justice O'Neill. The ma-
jority opinion was authored by Justice Owen, who has since left the court
to assume her appointment to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. Four
justices joined in the majority opinion in its entirety, two justices joined in
parts, and two justices did not participate in the decision. Three justices
also filed concurring opinions, but no dissenting opinions were filed.11 In
his concurring opinion, Justice Hecht stated that while distinctions could
5. Id. at *12 (citing G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544
(Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holdings approved)).
6. Id. at *12-13.
7. Id. at *14.
8. Id. at *14-15.
9. Id. at *19.
10. Id. at *28.
11. Id. at *1.
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be made between this case and Matagorda County, those distinctions
were immaterial, and "the rule in Matagorda County cannot survive to-
day's decision for the reasons Matagorda County was wrongly decided.11 2
However, the majority opinion does not go so far as overruling Mata-
gorda County; it merely "clarif[ies]" Matagorda County.13
Regardless of how the holding is classified, this decision represents a
significant shift in the court's views concerning, and a clear expansion of,
an insurer's right to reimbursement. The court has granted rehearing, so
the case is still pending before the supreme court. Given the importance
of this issue to both insurers and insureds and the continuing changes in
the court's makeup, this case is certainly one to keep watching.
The ultimate decision in Frank's Casing will likely influence litigation
on a related issue-whether an insurer is entitled to reimbursement from
the insured of costs paid to defend the insured if it is determined that the
insurer had no duty to defend the underlying action. While this issue was
hinted at by Justice Owen and Justice Hecht in their dissent in Matagorda
County,14 it was not addressed by the Texas Supreme Court in either
Matagorda County or Frank's Casing and has not been squarely decided
by any Texas court. However, a federal district court in another jurisdic-
tion has relied on Frank's Casing and "suggest[ions]" in the court of ap-
peals' decision in Matagorda County15 to conclude that the Texas
Supreme Court would apply the doctrine of quantum meruit and would
permit reimbursement of defense costs if the insurer reserves its rights
and notifies the insured of its intent to seek reimbursement in the event
that it is later determined that there was no duty to defend.16
II. EXTRACONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. ARTICLE 21.5517
1. When an Insurer Tenders Partial Payment on a Disputed Claim, It
Avoids the Article 21.55 Penalty on the Paid Amount
In Republic Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Mex-Tex, Inc., the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed whether an insurer's partial payment of the claim
avoided, on that amount, the 18% per annum penalty imposed by Article
21.55.18 Mex-Tex, Inc. submitted a claim to its commercial property in-
surer, Republic Underwriters Insurance Company, for hail damage to the
12. Id. at *28 (Hecht, J., concurring).
13. Id. at *24.
14. Matagorda County, 52 S.W.3d at 140-41 (Owen, J., dissenting, joined by Hecht, J.).
15. Matagorda County v. Tex. Ass'n of Counties County Gov't Risk Mgmt. Pool, 975
S.W.2d 782, 784-85 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1998), affd, 52 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2000).
16. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 377 F. Supp. 2d 719,
722-25 (D. Minn. 2005).
17. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55 (Vernon 1991). Effective April 1, 2005, Article
21.55 was repealed and recodified, without any substantive change, as Subchapter B of
Chapter 542 of the Texas Insurance Code, entitled "Prompt Payment of Claims." TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. §§ 542.051-.061 (Vernon 2005).
18. 150 S.W.3d 423 (Tex. 2004).
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roof of a shopping center that it owned. Mex-Tex retained a contractor to
replace the roof at a cost of $179,000. Republic sent Mex-Tex a check for
$145,460, the amount that Republic's engineer determined was the cost of
replacing the roof with an identical one. After twice rejecting the check,
Mex-Tex accepted the check as partial payment of its claim and then sued
Republic for breach of the policy. The trial court awarded Mex-Tex the
difference of $33,540, along with an 18% penalty on the entire $179,000
from seventy-five days after Republic tendered the partial payment to the
date Mex-Tex accepted the partial payment, and on the $33,540 differ-
ence from the date of the partial payment to the date of judgment. The
court of appeals affirmed. 19
In reversing the judgment, the supreme court explained that Article
21.55 defines a "claim" as a first-party claim made by an insured "that
must be paid by the insurer directly to the insured. '20 This definition
limits a claim to the amount ultimately determined to be owed, which
would exclude any partial payments that the insurer made before that
determination. The insurer's partial payment, however, cannot be condi-
tioned on a release of the entire claim. This approach encourages insur-
ers to pay the undisputed portion of a claim early, which is consistent
with the statute's purpose of obtaining prompt payment of claims.21 Ap-
plying this reasoning, the court concluded that Mex-Tex was entitled to
the penalty only on the $33,540 difference from seventy-five days after
the partial payment to the date of the judgment. 22
2. Whether Article 21.55 Applies to a Claim for Defense Costs under a
Liability Policy
An ongoing issue of debate in Texas is whether Article 21.55 applies to
an insured's claim for a defense under a liability policy. Federal district
courts in Texas have generally held that an insured's demand for a de-
fense is a first-party claim that is subject to Article 21.55 and continued to
do so during this Survey period.23 However, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals concluded that Article 21.55 does not apply to claims for defense
costs because such claims are not first-party claims as that term is used in
Article 21.55.24 In reaching this conclusion, the court stated that it agreed
with the rationale enunciated by the Dallas Court of Appeals-that a re-
quest for a defense is not a first-party claim for money to be paid directly
to the insured, that damages for refusing to defend are breach of contract
damages not subject to Article 21.55, and that the structure of Article
21.55 makes it unworkable when applied to an insured's demand for a
19. Id. at 424-25.
20. Id. at 426 n.8 (quoting TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.55, § 1(3) (Vernon 1991)).
21. Id. at 426.
22. Id. at 427-28.
23. Rx.com Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 609, 620 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
24. Service Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. J.C. Wink, Inc., 182 S.W.3d 19, 34 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 2005, pet. filed).
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defense. 25 These decisions are essentially irreconcilable, and thus, there
exists a split in authority on this issue between the federal district courts
and the state appellate courts. To date, the Texas Supreme Court has
declined to resolve the issue.
The Fifth Circuit also weighed in on this issue, explaining that under
Article 21.55, "a first-party claim is an immediate direct diminution of the
insured's assets, in contrast to a third-party claim, which goes through the
first-party as a conduit."' 26 The court determined that a claim for defense
costs by the assignee of the insured was not a first-party claim for damage
suffered directly by the insured and that the assignee was not the holder
of the policy or a named beneficiary. The court therefore concluded that
Article 21.55 did not apply to the claim.27 In a subsequent opinion, how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit recognized the split in authority and certified the
following issue to the Texas Supreme Court: "[D]oes Article 21.55 of the
Texas Insurance Code apply to a CGL insurer's breach of the duty to
defend?" 28 Although the supreme court has accepted the case, it will
most likely address the question only if it first determines that the insurer
breached the duty to defend. Thus, there is a chance that this issue will
remain unresolved, in which case the conflict between federal and state
courts will likely continue.
B. ARTICLE 21.2129
1. Article 21.21 Does Not Apply to Sureties
The Texas Supreme Court addressed whether Article 21.21 applied to a
dispute over commissions to be paid under an agreement between an in-
surer and an agency, which provided that the agency would issue surety,
performance, and bid bonds on behalf of the insurer. 30 Article 21.21 pro-
vides a private cause of action for unfair or deceptive acts or practices "in
the business of insurance."' 31 The court previously held that the term "the
business of insurance," as used in Article 21.21, does not include surety-
ship. 32 The court of appeals read this prior decision narrowly as applying
only to disputes between sureties and their bondholders, not between
sureties and their sales agents. In rejecting the court of appeals' analysis,
25. Id. at 31 (citing TIG Ins. Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232, 239-40
(Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied)).
26. Singleentry.com, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 117 F. App'x 933,938 (5th
Cir. 2004).
27. Id.
28. Lamar Homes, Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 428 F.3d 193, 199-201 (5th Cir.
2005).
29. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21 (Vernon 1991). Effective April 1, 2005, Article
21.21 was repealed and recodified without any substantive change as Chapter 541 of the
Texas Insurance Code, entitled "Unfair Methods of Competition and Unfair or Deceptive
Acts or Practices." TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 541.001 et seq. (Vernon 2005).
30. Dallas Fire Ins. Co. v. Tex. Contractors Sur. & Cas. Agency, 159 S.W.3d 895, 896
(Tex. 2004).
31. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 16(a) (Vernon 2005).
32. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. N. Austin Util. Dist. No. 1, 908 S.W.2d 415, 424 (Tex. 1995).
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the supreme court explained that its prior holding in Great American was
not limited to parts of the business of suretyship and that by limiting the
scope of Article 21.21 to "the business of insurance," the legislature "in-
tended it to apply to a species of economic enterprise, not to particular
contracts on a piecemeal basis."'33 Because the claims at issue arose in
the business of suretyship, not the business of insurance, the supreme
court concluded that Article 21.21 did not apply and therefore reversed
the court of appeals' judgment. 34
2. Class Actions Brought by the Attorney General Must Comply with
the Procedural Requirements of Article 21.21
The Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether the Attorney General
may maintain a class action under Article 21.21 without satisfying the Ar-
ticle's procedural requirements. 35 Section 17 of Article 21.21 authorizes
the Attorney General, at the request of the Texas Department of Insur-
ance, to institute a class-action suit to recover from an insurer damages
for injuries done to the insurance-buying public. 36 Section 18 sets out the
procedural requirements for class actions, specifically requiring the ap-
pointment of a class representative. 37 The Attorney General initiated a
class action under Section 17 against Farmers Group, Inc. and its related
insurance providers, alleging that Farmers failed to adequately disclose its
rating practices and the use of credit scoring and that some of its rating
practices were unfairly discriminatory. The Attorney General, however,
did not appoint a class representative as required by Section 18. The trial
court found that "strict compliance with Section 18 was unnecessary be-
cause the Attorney General was qualified through his capacity as parens
patriae to adequately represent the interests of the potential class mem-
bers without the appointment of a class representative. ' 38 Based on the
language of the statute, the court determined that a class-action suit
brought by the Attorney General should be treated the same as those
brought by insurance purchasers. In other words, when the Attorney
General brings a class-action suit under Section 17, he must comply with
the procedural requirements in Section 18. The court therefore reversed
the trial court's order certifying the class.39
33. Dallas Fire Ins. Co., 159 S.W.3d at 896-97.
34. Id. at 897.
35. Lubin v. Farmers Group, Inc., 157 S.W.3d 113 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, pet. filed).
36. Id. at 115 (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 17(a) (Vernon 2005)).
37. Id. (citing TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 21.21, § 18 (Vernon 2005)).
38. Id. at 115-16.
39. Id. at 116, 124, 129.
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C. THE DuTY OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING
1. A Federal District Court Held That a Claim for Indemnity under a
D&O Policy Is a First-Party Claim Subject to the Duty of
Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Westcott Holdings, Inc. v. Monitor Liability Managers, Inc., the in-
sured corporation sued its insurer for breach of contract and bad faith in
failing to pay costs that it incurred in two underlying lawsuits under a
directors' and officers' liability policy, which provided coverage for
"wrongful acts" committed by the corporation's directors and officers to
the extent that the corporation indemnified the directors and officers.40
The court acknowledged that the Texas Supreme Court rejected applica-
tion of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to third-party insurance
cases.41 Further, in a prior concurrence, four Texas Supreme Court jus-
tices had noted that many courts have imposed a duty of good faith in
first-party, but not third-party, cases because "'an insurer's and an in-
sured's interests are not aligned when the insured is claiming on his own
behalf as they are or should be in third-party cases where insurer and
insured face a common opponent.'"42 Thus, the determination of
whether a duty of good faith exists depends on whether the claim at issue
is a third-party or a first-party claim. In this case, the court determined
that the interests of the insured corporation and the insurer were not al-
igned. Before the insurer had any obligation under the policy to indem-
nify the insured corporation, the insured corporation had to first
indemnify its directors and officers. Thus, the loss for which the insured
sought recovery (the indemnification of its directors and officers) was its
own, not that of a third party. Under these circumstances, the court
found that there was no "adversarial relationship" between the insured
and its directors and officers, as exists in cases in which a third party sues
an insured.43 Because the insurer's duty to pay ran directly to the insured
and because the insurance protected the insured "against loss actually
paid (the insured's own loss) rather than loss arising from liabilities (inju-
ries to a third party)," the court concluded that the insurance coverage at
issue was first party, thus making the insurer subject to a cause of action
for bad faith.44
2. An Insurer Who Denies Coverage Based on Reasonable Reliance on
an Objectively Prepared Expert Report Is Not Liable for
Bad Faith
The Dallas Court of Appeals has reiterated that a bona fide dispute
about the insurer's liability on an insurance contract does not rise to the
40. No. H-05-1945, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20149, at *2-3 (S.D. Tex. 2005).
41. Id. at *18 (citing Md. Ins. Co. v. Head Indus. Coatings & Servs., Inc., 938 S.W.2d
27 (Tex. 1996)).
42. Id. at *22 (citing Universe Life Ins. Co. v. Giles, 950 S.W.2d 48, 60 (Tex. 1997)).
43. Id. at *23.
44. Id. at *23.
2006] 1385
SMU LAW REVIEW
level of bad faith.45 In this case, the insured homeowners alleged that the
insurer hired a biased engineer to investigate their foundation problems
and thus failed to reasonably investigate their claim for foundation re-
pairs. The jury awarded contractual and extra-contractual damages to the
homeowners, and the insurer appealed. 46
Even though the court of appeals upheld the finding of breach of con-
tract and the award of contractual damages, it concluded that the evi-
dence was legally insufficient to support the finding of bad faith. The
court explained that "the common-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
is breached when an insurer denies or delays payment of a claim after its
liability has become reasonably clear."'47 The court elaborated on what
constitutes bad faith. First, there must be more evidence than just that of
a bona fide coverage dispute. Second, the insurer must have done more
than rely on an expert's report, unless it is shown that the report was not
objectively prepared or that the insurer's reliance on the report was
unreasonable. 48
Considering the evidence in light of this standard, the court noted that,
after receipt of the claim, the insurer immediately sent an adjuster and
plumbers to the house to repair the leak and hired an engineer to assess
the damages from the leak. Further, based on objective factors, such as
elevation measurements, the home's history, and test results, along with
four inspections of the house, the engineer concluded that the structure
of the foundation had not been compromised by the leak. The court con-
cluded that this evidence was sufficient to show that the engineer's report
was objectively prepared and that the insurer's reliance on the report was
reasonable. Emphasizing that "an insurer has the right to deny question-
able claims without being subject to liability for the erroneous denial of a
claim," the court reversed the finding of a breach of the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.49
D. STOWERS DUTIES BETWEEN CO-PRIMARY INSURERS
The Fifth Circuit addressed the obligations under Stowers50 owed be-
tween two liability insurers with respect to a common insured. 51 Liberty
Mutual Insurance Company and Mid-Continent Insurance Company
both insured Kinsel Industries under respective $1 million comprehensive
general liability ("CGL") policies. Both insurers defended Kinsel against
a third-party claim. When the case ultimately settled for $1.5 million,
Mid-Continent paid only $150,000. Liberty Mutual, which also had a $10
million umbrella excess policy covering Kinsel, paid the remaining $1.35
45. United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Croft, 175 S.W.3d 457 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet.
denied).
46. Id. at 462.
47. Id. at 469.
48. Id. at 469-70.
49. Id. at 469-71.
50. 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holdings approved).
51. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mid-Continent Ins. Co., 405 F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2005).
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million. Both CGL policies included "other insurance" clauses, which
provided for pro rata sharing up to policy limits. Both policies also con-
tained "voluntary payment" and subrogation clauses. Based on these
provisions, Liberty Mutual sued Mid-Continent for $600,000, the unpaid
portion of Mid-Continent's pro rata share of the $1.5 million settlement.52
On appeal, Mid-Continent argued that, because it timely acknowl-
edged policy coverage of and defended Kinsel, it was entitled to deter-
mine how much it would pay or offer to pay in settlement and owed no
duty in that respect to Liberty Mutual. Mid-Continent claimed that its
only duty was to indemnify Kinsel for an adverse judgment up to the
policy limits and, under Stowers, to pay an excess judgment if its refusal of
a settlement offer within policy limits was unreasonable. Mid-Continent
asserted that because it did not breach any duty under its policy or Stow-
ers, there were no claims to which Liberty Mutual could be subrogated.53
After examining several appellate decisions, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that there was no controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent addressing
the duties owed between co-primary insurers under Stowers. Accord-
ingly, the Fifth Circuit certified the following questions to the Texas Su-
preme Court:
1. Two insurers, providing the same insured applicable primary in-
surance liability coverage under policies with $1 million limits and
standard provisions (one insurer also providing the insured coverage
under a $10 million excess policy), cooperatively assume defense of
the suit against their common insured, admitting coverage. The in-
surer also issuing the excess policy procures an offer to settle for the
reasonable amount of $1.5 million and demands that the other in-
surer contribute its proportionate part of that settlement, but the
other insurer, unreasonably valuing the case at no more than
$300,000, contributes only $150,000, although it could contribute as
much as $700,000 without exceeding its remaining available policy
limits. As a result, the case settles (without an actual trial) for $1.5
million funded $1.35 million by the insurer which also issued the ex-
cess policy and $150,000 by the other insurer.
In that situation is any actionable duty owed (directly or by subroga-
tion to the insured's rights) to the insurer paying the $ 1.35 million by
the underpaying insurer to reimburse the former respecting its pay-
ment of more than its proportionate part of the settlement?
2. If there is potentially such a duty, does it depend on the un-
derpaying insurer having been negligent in its ultimate evaluation of
the case as worth no more than $300,000, or does the duty depend on
the underpaying insured's evaluation having been sufficiently wrong-
ful to justify an action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing for denial of a first party claim, or is the existence of the duty
measured by some other standard?
52. Id. at 298-99.
53. Id. at 301-02.
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3. If there is potentially such a duty, is it limited to a duty owed the
overpaying insurer respecting the $ 350,000 it paid on the settlement
under its excess policy? 54
E. SEVERANCE OR BIFURCATION OF EXTRA-CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
FROM CONTRACTUAL CLAIMS
In In re Allstate Texas Lloyd's, the insurer sought mandamus relief
from the trial court's denial of its motion to sever the insured homeown-
ers' extra-contractual claims of bad faith from their breach-of-contract
claims. 55 The court of appeals explained that "insurance coverage claims
and bad faith claims are, by their nature, independent claims . . .[and
that] ... an insured usually may not prevail on an extra-contractual claim
without first proving the insurer breached the contract. '56 The court then
provided examples of when severance would be proper, such as when the
insurer has made a settlement offer on the disputed contract claim. In
this case, following a pretrial mediation, the insurer had made an offer to
the insureds to settle all the disputed breach-of-contract claims, which the
insureds rejected. Based on this settlement offer, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion
for severance and granted mandamus relief directing the trial court to
grant the motion for severance. 57
III. CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY
A. THE DUTY TO DEFEND
1. The "Eight-Corners" Rule
The Fifth Circuit reiterated the standards to be applied in determining
whether the allegations against the insured are sufficient to trigger the
insurer's duty to defend. 58 In Texas, this determination is governed by
the eight-corners rule, under which the four corners of the pleading are
compared to the four corners of the insurance policy. For a duty to de-
fend to exist, the pleadings, liberally interpreted and presumed true, must
allege facts within the scope of coverage. If coverage exists for any part
54. Id. at 310, amended by 407 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 2005) (clarifying that the settlement
of the claims against Kinsel occurred before Mid-Continent's settlement of other claims
pending against its named insured and that when it settled, the limits of the Mid-Continent
policy had not been reduced and were still subject to the unresolved claims against the
named insured).
55. No. 14-05-00762-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 7333, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] Sept. 2, 2005, orig. proceeding).
56. Id. at *3.
57. Id. at *3-11. Cf. In re Allstate Ins. Co., No. 06-05-00051-CV, 2005 Tex. App.
LEXIS 3610, at *6-7 (Tex. App.-Texarkana May 12, 2005, orig. proceeding) (concluding
that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying severance because the insurer
provided no evidence of what specific settlement offers, if any, were actually tendered,
what the nature of these offers were, or whether the insured rejected the offers, and that
the parties would be adequately protected by simply bifurcating the contractual and extra-
contractual issues into two trials before the same jury).
58. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Disability Servs. of the Sw. Inc., 400 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2005).
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of a suit, the insurer must defend the entire suit. However, if a covered
cause is related and interdependent to the excluded cause of injury, there
is no duty to defend. Any doubt as to whether the allegations state a
cause of action within coverage will be resolved in the insured's favor.59
The San Antonio Court of Appeals further emphasized that, although
the eight-corners rule requires the court to give a liberal interpretation to
the allegations, the court may not "read facts into the pleadings, look
outside the pleadings, or imagine factual scenarios that might trigger cov-
erage. ' '60 In that case, the insurer argued that no duty to defend existed
because the petition alleged only that the plaintiffs had purchased used
cars after October 1, 1993 and did not allege that the insured harmed the
plaintiffs during the policy period of September 1997 to September 2000.
In rejecting this argument, the court explained that, while the petition did
not give specific dates for the disputed transactions, it did allege that all
the sales occurred between October 1993 and September 2002, which en-
compassed the policy period. Construing the factual allegations liberally,
the court concluded that the petition potentially alleged damages from
conduct occurring during the policy period and, therefore, that the in-
surer had to defend.61
While acknowledging that Texas applies the eight-corners rule, a deci-
sion from the Northern District of Texas stated that a court may look at
evidence outside the pleadings under certain circumstances. 62 For exam-
ple, whether a person is insured or not should be determined by true
facts, not false, fraudulent, or otherwise incorrect facts, that might be al-
leged by a claimant.63 In this case, the business-auto policy defined the
term "insured" to include anyone using the covered auto with the named
insured's permission.64 Because the underlying pleading did not allege
that the defendant was using a covered auto with the named insured's
permission, the court concluded that the defendant did not qualify as an
insured and that the insurer, therefore, did not have a duty to defend.65
59. Id. at 263-64. See also Huffhines v. State Farm Lloyds, 167 S.W.3d 493, 496-97
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that the insurer "is obligated to
defend if potentially there is a case under the complaint within the coverage") (emphasis in
original); Archon Invs., Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., 174 S.W.3d 334 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. filed) (explaining that, as a general rule, the insurer is obli-
gated to defend if there is, potentially, an action alleged within the policy coverage, even if
the allegations do not clearly show that there is coverage).
60. Serv. Lloyd's Ins. Co. v. J.C. Wink, Inc., 182 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio
2005, pet. filed).
61. Id. at 28-29.
62. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Graham, 407 F. Supp. 2d 808, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
63. Id. (citing Blue Ridge Ins. Co. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 748 F. Supp. 470, 473 (N.D.
Tex. 1990)).
64. Id. at 811.
65. Id. at 813-14. See also Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2005)
(concluding that a business-auto insurer had no duty to defend allegations against a bus
owner for negligent actions in hiring, supervision, and entrustment because the owner's
negligence would not exist "but for" the bus crash, which was not covered because it oc-
curred outside the policy's coverage territory).
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2. The Insurer's Right to Control the Defense
In Ross v. Marshall, the insurer sought to intervene in a suit against its
insured to appeal a $10 million judgment against its insured.66 The dis-
trict court denied the motion to intervene, and the insurer appealed.67
The Fifth Circuit explained that, under the federal rule governing inter-
vention, the potential intervenor must assert an interest related to the
property or transaction at issue in the case. To meet this requirement, the
intervenor must point to an interest that is direct, substantial, and legally
protectable. 68
The insurer argued that its interest was a substantial judgment against
its insured. Agreeing with the insurer, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that,
"without question, an insurer has a financial stake in securing a favorable
outcome for its insured in a lawsuit alleging potentially covered claims.
This financial interest is particularly strong when, as here, the insurer has
been given an opportunity to defend the suit and, therefore, is in privity
with the insured as to ensuing judgment." 69 For this reason, policies often
give the insurer the right to take control of the insured's defense or con-
tractually require insurers to defend.7 0
While the court easily concluded that the insurer has a financial stake,
the court had more difficulty determining whether the insurer's interest
was sufficiently direct to permit intervention as of right. The court con-
cluded that an insurer that reserves its rights does not surrender its inter-
est in minimizing the liability of its insured. In this case, because a
judgment already existed against the insured, the insurer's intervention
would not interfere with the insured's defense, and the insurer could not
attempt to steer the jury towards a verdict holding the insured liable on
non-covered grounds. To the contrary, "[the insurer's] interest in mini-
mizing the potential exposure was aligned with [the insured's] interest in
avoiding a $10 million judgment."'71 Further, because the insured had as-
signed its rights against the insurer to the claimants, the insurer had a
second interest in the litigation-minimizing its potential exposure in a
bad-faith claim. Based on these facts, the court concluded that the in-
surer had a sufficient interest in the suit to merit intervention as of right
to appeal the judgment and, therefore, that the district court erred in de-
nying the motion for intervention. 72
66. 426 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 2005).
67. Id. at 748.
68. Id. at 757 (citing New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 732
F.2d 452, 463 (5th Cir. 1984)).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 759.
72. Id. at 758-61.
1390 [Vol. 59
Insurance Law
B. WHETHER AN INSURER MUST BE PREJUDICED IN ORDER TO
DENY COVERAGE BASED ON LATE NOTICE
Several federal and state courts issued opinions during this Survey pe-
riod analyzing whether an insurer is required to show prejudice in order
to deny coverage based on the insured's breach of the policy's notice pro-
visions. These opinions instruct that the application of a prejudice re-
quirement depends on the type of policy at issue.
In Ridglea Estate Condominium Ass'n v. Lexington Insurance Co., the
Fifth Circuit considered whether the insurer was required to show that it
was prejudiced by the insured's breach of the provision of the property
insurance policy requiring "prompt notice of the loss or damage. ' 73 The
court explained that it is "quite clear that Texas law requires a showing of
prejudice in order to raise breach of a notice requirement as a defense
against claims on certain types of policies. 74 For example, certain orders
of the Texas Department of Insurance require statements in general-lia-
bility and automobile insurance policies that any provision requiring no-
tice of occurrence or loss will not bar liability unless the insurer is
prejudiced by the insured's failure to comply with the notice provision.75
The insurer argued that the prejudice requirement applies only to those
types of policies designated in the orders-general liability and automo-
bile. In rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit relied on the general
principles of contract interpretation previously enunciated by the Texas
Supreme Court.76 According to contract law, when one party commits a
material breach, the other party is discharged from any obligation to per-
form. To determine whether a breach is material, the court must consider
"the extent to which the non-breaching party will be deprived of the ben-
efit that it could have reasonable anticipated from full performance. '77
Following this reasoning, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the prejudice
requirement applied to the property insurance policy at issue and re-
manded the case to the trial court for a determination of whether the
insurer had been prejudiced by the insured's late notice. 78
Importantly, the Ridglea court emphasized that its holding was "a nar-
row one," and that it did not read Hernandez as necessarily creating a
73. No. 04-10447, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16724, at *3, *14 (5th Cir. Aug. 10, 2005) (op.
on reh'g).
74. Id. at *14.
75. Id. (citing Texas State Board of Insurance Order No. 23080).
76. Id. at *14-15 (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994)
(concluding that an insurer that is not prejudiced by an insured's settlement may not deny
coverage based on a settlement-without-consent provision)).
77. Id. at *16 (citing Hernandez, 875 S.W.3d at 693).
78. Id. See also Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co. v. FFE Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 3:03-CV-
1752-BF, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23958, at *19-20 (N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that insurer had
established prejudice because the insured did not give notice until after the case went to
trial and judgment had been entered against the insured for $1.1 million, and that the
insured's lack of notice foreclosed guarantees to the insurer under the policy, including the
opportunity to investigate the accident, to contribute to the development of a defense




prejudice requirement for all insurance policies issued in Texas. For in-
stance, the court affirmed its prior holding that an insurer may deny cov-
erage under a "claims made" liability policy without a showing of
prejudice.79 Consistent with this statement, the Fifth Circuit recently
held in a second opinion that "[ain insurer is not required to show
prejudice from late notice where a claims-made policy is involved." 80 The
court explained that under an occurrence policy, an occurrence during
the policy period is sufficient to trigger coverage. In contrast, under a
claims-made policy, providing notice triggers the insured's coverage. The
court was unwilling to apply a prejudice requirement to claims-made poli-
cies because to do so would interfere with the right to contract. As the
court explained, "A party rightly should be held to know the conditions
of the policy and the conscious choice that it made in selecting a claims-
made policy instead of an occurrence policy."81 The court therefore con-
cluded that "the failure to provide proper notice under a claims-made
policy negates coverage, regardless of whether the insurer has been
prejudiced.'"82
The Singleentry.com opinion is also significant because the court recog-
nized that an insured's delay in providing notice can constitute a breach
of a claims-made policy's notice requirement even if the notice is given
during the policy period. In that case, the insured learned of the litigation
against it on December 7, 2000, but did not notify the insurer until Sep-
tember 18, 2001. Despite this nine-month delay, the insured argued that
coverage existed because notice was given before the policy's expiration
on November 9, 2001. The Fifth Circuit rejected this argument as "un-
availing" in light of the policy language that "specifically mandated that
notice be provided 'as soon as possible." 83 Noting that "there is ample
Texas authority that taking eleven months to notify an insurer is not 'as
soon as practicable,"' the court concluded that the insured breached the
policy's notice requirement.8 4
In Paj, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., the Dallas Court of Appeals similarly
recognized that the application of a prejudice requirement depends on
the type of coverage at issue. 85 However, in contrast to the Fifth Circuit,
the court concluded that Hernandez was not controlling because that case
79. Id. at *16 n.4 (citing Matador Petroleum Corp. v. St. Paul Surplus Lines Ins. Co.,
174 F.3d 653, 659 (5th Cir. 1999)).
80. Singleentry.com, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 117 F. App'x 933, 936 (5th
Cir. 2004).
81. Id.
82. Id. (further stating that a showing of prejudice is required only in narrowly defined
cases involving bodily injury and property damage).
83. Id. at 935, 937.
84. Id. at 937. See also First Prof'l Ins. Co., Inc. v. Heart & Vascular Inst. of Tex., 182
S.W.3d 6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (concluding that, under a claims-made
policy, notice to the insurer of claims made against two physicians practicing in the same
medical group did not constitute timely notice of a claim against the group itself if the
policy required notice of "claims," not a liability "event," and if the letters from the claim-
ants that were forwarded to the insurer did not assert a claim against the group).
85. 170 S.W.3d 258 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. granted).
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did not deal with a notice provision or any other condition precedent, but
rather a settlement-without-consent exclusion.86 The court stated, "We
see a significant difference between a policy condition (performance of
which is necessary to trigger any obligation for coverage) and a policy
exclusion (which operates only after the obligation for coverage is in
place)."87
The court emphasized that before the endorsement requiring prejudice
was added to general-liability policies under the 1973 board order, failure
to perform a notice condition was an absolute defense to liability on the
policy.88 The policy at issue contained the mandated endorsement impos-
ing a prejudice requirement with respect to bodily-injury and property-
damage liability under "Coverage A." The court concluded that this en-
dorsement was limited to claims for bodily injury and property damage
and, therefore, did not apply to the copyright-infringement claim at issue,
which implicated only personal- and advertising-injury liability under
"Coverage B." "For thirty years, the entities charged with overseeing
these matters have declined to broaden the endorsement's language to
include advertising injury, and we will not imply such a change in the
policy before us." 89 Accordingly, the court declined to impose a
prejudice requirement and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in
favor of the insurer.90
C. CGL POLICIES
1. Issue of Whether Construction-Defect Claims Allege an
"Occurrence" and "Property Damage" Was Certified to the
Texas Supreme Court
As in the last Survey, insurers, insureds, and courts continued to strug-
gle in determining whether allegations meet the "occurrence" require-
ment of general-liability policies, particularly in the context of
construction-defect claims. Until the Texas Supreme Court addresses this
issue, it will continue to present difficulties. Fortunately, it will have the
opportunity to do so, as the Fifth Circuit recently determined that these
issues should be certified to the supreme court. 91
The Fifth Circuit explained that state intermediate courts of appeal and
federal district courts in Texas are split on whether construction-defect
claims allege an "occurrence" and "property damage," as those terms are
used in CGL policies. Courts that have found that construction errors do
not constitute an "occurrence" generally conclude that a claim for bad
workmanship is really a claim for breach of contract, which is not cov-
86. Id. at 263 (citing Hernandez, 875 S.W.2d at 692).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 262-63 (citing Members Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cutaia, 476 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex.
1972)).
89. Id. at 263.
90. Id.




ered, reasoning that shoddy work is foreseeable by the contractor and,
therefore, is not an accidental or unexpected loss. In finding no "prop-
erty damage," these courts reason that claims for the cost of repairing
faulty workmanship are nothing more than claims for economic loss,
which are damages that typically flow from a breach of contract and that
a CGL policy does not insure against business risks, as to do so would
result in little difference between a CGL policy and a performance
bond. 92
In contrast, courts that have found an "occurrence" in this context gen-
erally determine that, if the shoddy workmanship is the result of the
builder's negligence, rather than intentional conduct, the loss is unex-
pected and, therefore, accidental. In finding "property damage," these
courts reason that when construction errors cause physical damage to the
object of the contract, such damage constitutes physical property damage
and is covered under the policy regardless of whether the only tangible
property damaged was the residence itself.93
Noting the frequency with which this issue is litigated and the copious
amount of conflicting caselaw on both sides regarding whether construc-
tion errors causing damage to the subject of the contract constitute an
"occurrence" causing "property damage" under a CGL policy, the Fifth
Circuit decided that the issue should be resolved by the Texas Supreme
Court and, accordingly, certified the following questions:
1. When a homebuyer sues his general contractor for construction
defects and alleges only damage to or loss of use of the home itself,
do such allegations allege an "accident" or "occurrence" sufficient to
trigger the duty to defend or indemnify under a CGL policy?
2. When a homebuyer sues his general contractor for construction
defects and alleges only damage to or loss of use of the home itself,
do such allegations allege "property damage" sufficient to trigger the
duty to defend or indemnify under a CGL policy? 94
92. Id. at 196-98.
93. Id. See also Home Owners Mgmt. Enters., Inc. v. Mid-Continent Cas. Co., 174
S.W.3d 334, 341-42 (N.D. Tex. 2005) (determining that because the claimant never alleged
that the insured intended to cause foundation damage to the home, but rather that the
damage was negligently caused by the insured, the allegation of negligence constituted an
accidental "occurrence" under the policy and was sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to
defend); Archon Invs., Inc. v. Great Am. Lloyds Ins. Co., No. 01-03-01299-CV, 2005 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6933, at *18-21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2005, pet. filed)
(finding duty to defend because pleading alleged that the insured was negligent; beached
the warranties of good workmanship, construction, and suitability; made negligent misrep-
resentations and violated the DTPA; and the insured's subcontractors were negligent);
Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 14-02-00860-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4214, at
*29 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2005, no pet.) (reasoning that the relevant
inquiry is not whether the insured damaged its own work, i.e., whether the claim sounds in
contract only, and concluding that defective construction resulting in damage to the in-
sured's own work can constitute an "occurrence" as long as the resulting damage was unin-
tentional and unexpected); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., No. SA-04-CA-192-
XR, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16212, at *13 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21,2005) (concluding that, in the
absence of allegations that the insured intentionally caused the damage, the construction-
defect claims alleged an "occurrence" under the CGL policy).
94. Lamar Homes, 428 F.3d at 199-201.
1394 [Vol. 59
Insurance Law
2. Whether Misrepresentation Claims Allege an "Occurrence"
In Federal Insurance Co. v. Ace Property & Casualty Co.,95 the insured,
Electronic Data Systems Corporation ("EDS"), was sued for damages
arising from its involvement in a purported project for the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization ("NATO"). As the general contractor on the pro-
ject, EDS invited two companies to bid on the project, representing to the
companies that the bidding process required them to ship sample prod-
ucts to NATO representatives who would have the right to destroy the
products as part of their testing procedures. Relying on EDS's represen-
tations, the companies signed authorization agreements and shipped
property worth millions. After three years of shipments, EDS and the
companies learned that the operation was a fraud and that the equipment
was sold for commercial purposes. The companies sued EDS for negli-
gent misrepresentations regarding the fraudulent scheme. EDS sought
coverage under two CGL policies, but the insurer refused to provide a
defense on the ground that the alleged negligent misrepresentations were
not "occurrences.
'96
The Fifth Circuit explained that, while EDS may not have known that
the NATO project was a hoax, it did expect that the companies' products
would never be returned. Because EDS intended the companies to ship
sample products, expecting that the products would never be returned,
the loss of those products was the natural and probable consequence of
EDS's representations. Regardless of the companies' characterization of
EDS's conduct as negligent, the cause of the alleged property damage
was EDS's intent and plan that the companies would permanently part
with their property. Under these facts, the court concluded that none of
EDS's conduct nor any of its alleged omissions was an "accident" within
the meaning of the CGL policies and, therefore, that the insurer had no
duty to defend or indemnify EDS.97
3. Determining the Number of Occurrences
In Lennar Corp. v. Great American Insurance Co., the Fourteenth Dis-
trict Court of Appeals also addressed whether the insured homebuilder's
application of defective synthetic stucco, called Exterior Insulation and
Finish System ("EIFS"), to numerous homes constituted one occurrence
or separate occurrences under the CGL policies.98 The court explained
that Texas courts apply a "cause" analysis to determine whether a set of
facts involves one or more occurrences. Under this analysis, the proper
focus is on the number of events that cause the injuries and result in the
insured's liability, rather than the number of injurious effects. 99 The in-
95. 429 F.3d 120 (5th Cir. 2005).
96. Id. at 121-22.
97. Id. at 125.
98. No. 14-02-00860-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 4214, at *1-5, *58-63 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2005, no pet.).
99. Id. at *58-59.
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sured contended that there was only one occurrence because there was
only one cause of damage to the homes-the EIFS's repeated and contin-
uous entrapment of water. Disagreeing with this contention, the court
reasoned that the insured was not the designer or the manufacturer of
EIFS. Rather, the insured's liability to a particular homeowner stemmed
from its application of EIFS and the resulting damage to the particular
home. Additionally, the EIFS's entrapment of water on a particular
home caused the damage to that home only; thus, the insured was ex-
posed to a new and separate liability for each home on which EIFS was
installed. The court therefore concluded that the EIFS claim against the
insured for each house constituted a separate occurrence. 1°°
4. The Business-Risk Exclusions
In Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Camaley Energy Co., the Northern
District of Texas analyzed whether the "business risk" exclusions in the
CGL policy applied to preclude coverage. 10 1 The underlying lawsuit al-
leged that the insureds were negligent in drilling, completing, producing,
and operating a well. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the insureds
failed to properly and adequately evaluate the location of the well bore
and trespassed onto a neighboring leasehold.102 Exclusion j(5) excluded
coverage for property damage to that particular part of real property on
which the insureds, or any contractors or subcontractors working on their
behalf, are performing operations, if the property damage arises out of
those operations. Because the plaintiffs alleged that the insureds' negli-
gence caused property damage to the property on which the insureds
were hired to work, the court found that the damages fell squarely within
this exclusion.10 3
The policy also contained a "your work" exclusion, which excluded
coverage for property damage to the insured's work arising out of it or
any part of it and included in the "products-completed operations haz-
ard," but did not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the
damage arises was performed by a subcontractor. Reading the pleading
liberally in favor of the insured, the court concluded that this exclusion
did not apply if the pleading was vague as to whether subcontractors
caused the damage. 10 4
Exclusion m excluded coverage for property damage to "impaired
property" or property that has not been physically injured arising out of:
(1) a defect, deficiency, inadequacy, or dangerous condition in the in-
sured's product or work, or (2) a delay or failure by the insureds or any-
100. Id. at *61-62.
101. 364 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606-08 (N.D. Tex. 2005).
102. Id. at 602.
103. Id. at 606-07.
104. Id. See also Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. JHP Dev., Inc., No. SA-04-CA-192-XR,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16212, at *16-17 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2005) (determining that the
policy's "your work" exclusion did not apply because the insured's work on the condomini-
ums had not yet been completed).
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one acting on their behalf to perform a contract or agreement in
accordance with its terms. The insurer argued that this exclusion applied
because the insureds' negligence caused the plaintiffs to lose their lease-
hold, amounting to a breach of contract. Conversely, the insureds argued
that the damages the plaintiffs sought did not fall within the definition of
"impaired property." The court disagreed, noting that this exclusion ap-
plies to "impaired property" or "property that has not been physically
injured," such as the leasehold at issue. The court found that the alleged
negligent conduct constituted a defect, deficiency, inadequacy, or danger-
ous condition in the insureds' work or, alternatively, a failure to perform
the work in accordance with their contract. The court concluded that the
exclusion barred coverage and, therefore, that the insured had no duty to
defend or indemnify.10 5
5. The Professional-Services Exclusion
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Disability Services of the Southwest, Inc.,
the underlying suit against the insured arose out of the death of a
quadriplegic under its care and alleged that the insured was negligent in
its provision of medical care to the deceased and in its failure to provide
the deceased with communication devices for emergencies. 10 6 The CGL
policy contained a professional-service exclusion that excluded coverage
for any bodily injury or property damage arising out of the rendering or
failure to render medical service, treatment, advice, instruction, or any
health or therapeutic service, treatment, advice, or instruction. The court
reasoned that, because communication with patients is vital to providing
health or nursing services, the claim that the death was caused by the
failure to provide communication devices was inseparable from the claim
that the insured failed to provide adequate medical care. The court con-
cluded that the exclusion applied and, therefore, that the insurer had no
duty to defend.10 7
D. HOMEOWNERS POLICIES
1. Seller's Misrepresentation to the Buyer Does Not Constitute an
"Occurrence" under a Homeowners Policy
In Huffhines v. State Farm Lloyds, the insured homeowners sold their
townhouse to two buyers. After the sale, the owner of the adjoining
townhouse sued the buyers, alleging that defects in the buyers' property
caused water to encroach on and damage her townhouse, and the buyers
in turn sued the insureds.10 8 The event or conduct at issue was the in-
sureds' assuring the buyers that they were not aware of defects of the
townhouse when the insureds did have knowledge of such defects, includ-
ing water encroaching. The court found that because water damage is of
105. Mid-Continent, 364 F. Supp. 2d at 606, 608.
106. 400 F.3d 260, 261-62 (5th Cir. 2005).
107. Id. at 262, 264-65.
108. 167 S.W.3d 493, 495-96 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
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a type that ordinarily follows from existing and undisclosed water en-
croachment, the property damage to the adjoining townhouse could be
reasonably anticipated by the insureds. The court concluded that the
pleading did not allege an "accident," that absent an "accident" there
could be no "occurrence" under policy, and that the insurer was not re-
quired to defend. 109
2. Whether Mold Damage Is Excluded from Coverage
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals addressed whether a Texas
Homeowner's Form B-T policy ("HOB-T") provided coverage for mold
damage. 110 The "Perils Insured Against" section of the policy stated that
the insurer would insure against physical loss to the property caused by a
listed peril, unless the loss was specifically excluded. One of the perils
listed was accidental discharge, leakage, or overflow of water or steam
from within a plumbing, heating, or air conditioning system or household
appliance. The insured argued that the mold damage to her personal
property was covered because it was caused by a leak from an air condi-
tioning system. Conversely, the insurer contended that because mold was
not a named peril in the policy, mold was excluded from coverage. The
court reasoned that the insurer's narrow view ignored the undeniable fact
that mold can be damage, and depending on the circumstances, a cause of
loss. The court concluded that if a named peril-the accidental discharge,
leakage, or overflow of water from the air conditioning system-caused
the mold, then the damage could be a physical loss covered under the
policy because this type of damage was not specifically excluded from
coverage. The court therefore reversed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the insurer and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 1 '
The Eastern District of Texas reached a different result in construing a
standard Texas Dwelling Policy-Form 3.112 Although the policy had a
specific exclusion for loss caused by mold, the insured argued that based
on the "ensuing loss" language of the exclusion, coverage is not excluded
if the mold is an ensuing loss from a covered event, such as water dam-
age. The court found this policy distinguishable from the standard Texas
Homeowner's Policy-Form B, which contains a Coverage B stating that
certain exclusions do not apply to loss caused by accidental discharge of
water. In contrast, the Form 3 policy specifically excludes mold damage.
Based on this distinction, the court determined that the "ensuing loss
caused by water damage" referred to water damage, which is the result,
109. Id. at 499. See also Allstate Tex. Lloyd's v. Meyers, No. 3:03-CV-2635-N 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1974, at *4-5 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2005) ("Under Texas law, sellers' misrepresen-
tations to purchasers are not covered 'occurrences' under the standard form homeowner's
insurance policy.").
110. De Laurentis v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 162 S.W.3d 714 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed) (op. on reh'g).
111. Id. at 721-25.
112. Malley v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 347 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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not the cause, of mold damage. Because the alleged mold damage re-
sulted from earlier water damage, the court concluded that the mold
damage was not covered by the policy. 113
3. The Business-Pursuits Exclusion
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hallman, the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a business-pursuits exclusion in a homeowners policy
barred coverage for a suit brought against the insured by neighboring
property owners for damages related to limestone mining on the in-
sured's property. 1 14 The policy specifically excluded coverage for bodily
injury or property damage arising out of or in connection with a business
that an insured engaged in, but not for activities that are ordinarily inci-
dental to non-business pursuits. The supreme court adopted the two-
prong standard previously enunciated by the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals requiring: (1) continuity or regularity of the activity, and (2) a profit
motive, usually as a means of livelihood, gainful employment, earning a
living, procuring subsistence, or financial gain." 15
Applying this standard, the court found that even though the insured
had executed only one lease ten years earlier, the mining activity re-
mained ongoing and, thus, met the continuity requirement. As to the
second requirement, while the underlying pleading did not refer to the
insured's pecuniary interest, the court reasoned that a profit motive could
be inferred from the nature of the activity, as a person does not allow
limestone mining with dynamite blasting to occur on his property without
some expectation of remuneration or monetary gain. Recognizing that
the purpose of the business-pursuits exclusion is to lower homeowners-
insurance premiums by removing coverage for activities that are not typi-
cally associated with the operation and maintenance of a home, the court
concluded that the mining lease constituted a business pursuit and, there-
fore, that the underlying lawsuit was excluded from coverage." 6
E. AUTO POLICIES
Two cases during this Survey period addressed uninsured/underinsured
motorist ("UMIUIM") coverage in Texas auto policies. In McDonald v.
Southern County Mutual Insurance Co., two men sought UIM coverage
for injuries that they sustained when they were struck by another vehicle
while walking along the 1-10 service road after they had left the vehicle to
get assistance for a tire blow-out on the tractor in which they had been
traveling. 1 7 The UM/UIM part of the policy defined an "insured" to in-
clude any person occupying a covered auto and defined "occupying" to
113. Id. at 348-50.
114. 159 S.W.3d 640, 641 (Tex. 2005).
115. Id. at 643-44 (citing United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Pennington, 810 S.W.2d 777, 778-
80 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied)).
116. Id. at 644-45.
117. 176 S.W.3d 464, 466 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
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mean "in, upon, getting in, on, out or off."' 118 The court explained that
"occupying" requires a causative nexus with the vehicle. Because the
men had crossed the road and were proceeding away from the vehicle,
the court concluded that the men were not "occupying" the vehicle and,
thus, did not constitute "insureds" under the UM/UIM coverage.1 19
In Burling v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co., David Burling made a
claim on his employer's commercial auto insurance policy, which the in-
surer denied on the ground that Burling was not listed as a designated
person on the UM/UIM coverage part of the policy. 120 This part defined
an "insured" to include designated persons, but the employer did not
name a designated person on the policy. Burling argued that the policy
was ambiguous as to whom it covered because the employer, a corpora-
tion, was the only named insured, and a corporation cannot be injured in
an automobile accident. The court reasoned that the corporation could
have named Burling as a designated person in the policy, which would
have created coverage for Burling, but it did not do so. While the failure
to designate Burling rendered the policy language regarding a designated
person inapplicable, it did not create an ambiguity. The court therefore
concluded that Burling did not qualify as an "insured" under the UMI
UIM coverage. 121
F. D&O LIABILITY POLICIES
1. To Allege a Loss under a D&O Policy, the Company Must
Specifically Plead That It Indemnified Its Directors and
Officers
In Westcott Holdings, Inc. v. Monitor Liability Managers, Inc., the in-
sured corporation sued its insurer for failure to pay costs that it incurred
in two underlying lawsuits under a directors' and officers' liability policy,
which provided coverage for "wrongful acts" committed by the corpora-
tion's directors and officers to the extent that the corporation indemni-
fied the directors and officers.'2 2 The insurer moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, 123 arguing that the corporation's petition failed to plead
indemnification of the directors and officers and, thus, failed to allege any
actual loss under the policy. In response, the corporation contended that
the formal grant of indemnification was unnecessary because it was
merely a condition precedent to the lawsuit and that the petition gener-
ally pleaded that all conditions precedent had been performed. 24
Rejecting the insured's contention, the court found that the corpora-
tion's obligation to indemnify its directors and officers was not a condi-
118. Id. at 466-67.
119. Id. at 469-72.
120. No. 05-04-00155-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 373, at *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 19,
2005, no pet.).
121. Id. at *3-7.
122. No. H-05-1945, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20149, at *1-3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2005).
123. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
124. See FED. R. Civ. P. 9(c).
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tion precedent, but rather a requirement for coverage under the policy.
The court emphasized that the language of Coverage Section B, which
explicitly stated that the insurer would pay losses to the corporation for
claims made against its directors and officers "to the extent that the Com-
pany has indemnified the Directors or Officers" clearly anticipated the
corporation's indemnification of its directors and officers as a require-
ment for establishing any right to payment of loss under the policy. 125
The court also rejected the corporation's reliance on its bylaws because
the indemnification provided by the bylaws was conditional (i.e., indem-
nification occurred only to the extent permitted by law and only if re-
quested by the directors and officers). The court concluded that the
existence of a conditional requirement for indemnification did not satisfy
the corporation's obligation to allege indemnification in order to establish
a loss covered by the policy: "Indemnification must be specifically
pleaded by the plaintiff.1 26
2. The Contractual-Liability Exclusion
The First District Court of Appeals analyzed the applicability of a con-
tractual-liability exclusion in a directors' and officer's ("D&O") liability
insurance policy.127 The insured officer sought coverage under the D&O
policy for an underlying lawsuit brought against him in his individual ca-
pacity by his former wife seeking alimony and other contractual rights
that she alleged she was owed under their divorce decree. The former
wife alleged that the officer covenanted in the divorce decree to receive
funds for her benefit and, as such, to act in a fiduciary capacity with re-
gard to her interests and that the officer breached his fiduciary duty to
her. a28 The policy excluded coverage for claims alleging, arising out of,
based upon, or attributable to any actual or alleged contractual liability of
the company or any insured under any express contract or agreement.
The court noted that each of the former wife's allegations arose out of,
was based upon, and could be attributed to specific sections of the di-
vorce decree and that the only breach of duty alleged was one that the
divorce decree expressly created. The court therefore concluded that the
contractual-liability exclusion barred coverage for all of the claims.129
G. PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY POLICIES
In Lexington Insurance Co. v. Educare Community Living Corp.-Gulf
Coast, the Fifth Circuit addressed whether the medical professional liabil-
ity ("MPL") coverage part of a policy provides coverage for a lawsuit
arising out the sexual assault of a resident of a group home by one of the
125. Westcott Holdings, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20149, at *9.
126. Id. at *10.
127. King, Chapman & Broussard Consulting Group, Inc. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co.,
171 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
128. Id. at 224.
129. Id. at 228-29.
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insured entity's employees. 130 The MPL coverage part covered amounts
that the entity became legally obligated to pay as damages resulting from
a medical incident arising out of professional services. The third subpart
of the definition of "professional services" listed supervising, teaching,
and proctoring others.131 The entity argued that the allegations against it
for negligent training and supervision of the employee fell within this sub-
part. The court, however, noted that such an argument wholly removed
the phrase from the list in which it was enumerated and from the context
that the list provided, namely professional healthcare. The court deter-
mined that, when read in context, the supervision and teaching must be
for healthcare services, which are professional in nature and demand ei-
ther specialized knowledge or recognized training. Because the entity's
training and supervision of the employees did not involve professional
services, the court concluded the MPL coverage part did not provide
coverage. 132
H. ADDITIONAL INSUREDS
Several courts issued opinions during this Survey period that analyzed
issues relating to additional insureds. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals
explained that in Texas, the term "additional insured" has a clear techni-
cal meaning-"a party protected under a policy without being named in
the policy. 1 33 A party typically becomes an additional insured under an
agreement obligating the named insured to add the additional insured to
the named insureds' pre-existing insurance policy. Texas courts have con-
sistently allowed an additional insured to seek coverage under such insur-
ance policies. 134 In this case, an employee of Vratsinas Construction
Company was injured when a construction trailer that he was occupying
blew over. Transport International Pool, Inc. d/b/a GE Capital Modular
Space ("GE") owned the trailer and leased it to Vratsinas. The employee
sued GE, which in turn sought indemnity from Vratsinas and its insurer.
The lease agreement between Vratsinas and GE provided that Vratsinas
would procure and keep in effect a CGL insurance policy naming GE as
an additional insured. Vratsinas' CGL policy insured any organization
from whom Vratsinas leased equipment as long as Vratsinas and the or-
ganization had agreed that the organization would be added as an addi-
tional insured. Because GE leased the trailer to Vratsinas, the court
concluded that GE was an additional insured under the policy.135
130. 149 F. App'x 326, 327 (5th Cir. 2005).
131. Id. at 329.
132. Id. at 329-31.
133. Transp. Int'l Pool, Inc. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 166 S.W.3d 781, 786 (Tex. App.-Fort
Worth, no pet.).
134. Id. at 786-87.
135. Id. at 783, 787. See also U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gnade, No. 10-03-00289-CV, 2005
Tex. App. LEXIS 1825, at *4-7 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 9, 2005, pet. denied) (concluding
that if a separate endorsement beyond the blanket additional insured endorsement ex-
pressly identifies the party, the party is an additional insured even though the named in-
sured is not contractually required to insure the party).
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In ALCOA v. Hydrochem Industrial Services, the Corpus Christi Court
of Appeals addressed the interplay between contractual indemnity provi-
sions and additional-insured provisions. 136 The court explained that lia-
bility insurance provisions are often included as part of indemnity
agreements to guard against an indemnitor's insolvency. If an additional-
insured provision is solely supplemental to the indemnity provision, it has
no effect beyond the applicability of the indemnity agreement. Con-
versely, an additional-insured provision that constitutes a separate obliga-
tion is not limited to the scope of any indemnity clause and could require
an obligor to provide insurance coverage to an obligee that would effec-
tively relieve the obligee of responsibility for its own actions without a
valid indemnity agreement.' 37 Two factors are considered in determining
whether an additional-insured provision is a separate and distinct obliga-
tion from an indemnity agreement: (1) whether the indemnity clause con-
tains an internal provision stating that insurance is required to cover the
extent of indemnity, and (2) whether the general additional-insured pro-
vision specifies that it applies whether or not required by the other con-
tract provisions.1 38
The contract at issue contained a section entitled "INSURANCE,"
providing that the seller could not commence work until it furnished the
buyer with certificates of insurance for specified policies and that the
buyer would be named as an additional insured in such policies. How-
ever, this section did not specify that it applied whether or not required
by other clauses in the contract, and the indemnity agreement in the con-
tract did not contain a separate, internal additional-insured provision.
The court concluded that the absence of these elements showed that the
additional-insured provision was not intended to stand alone as a distinct
obligation, but rather was intended only to assure the performance of the
indemnification agreement. Consequently, if the indemnification agree-
ment was found on remand to be unenforceable or inapplicable, the
buyer would not qualify as an additional insured. 139
I. "OTHER INSURANCE" PROVISIONS
The Fifth Circuit examined the interplay between the "other insur-
ance" clauses of two professional-liability policies issued to the insured
nursing home. 140 Texas law recognizes three types of "other insurance"
provisions: (1) pro rata clauses, which restrict the liability of concurring
insurers to an apportionment basis; (2) excess clauses, which restrict the
liability of an insurer to excess coverage, which pays out only after the
136. No. 13-02-00531-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 2010, at *30-32 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi Mar. 17, 2005, pet. denied).
137. Id. at *30-31.
138. Id. at *31 (citing Getty Oil Co. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 845 S.W.2d 794, 804-05 (Tex.
1992)).
139. Id. at *31-32.




primary coverage is exhausted; and (3) escape clauses, which avoid all
liability in the event of additional coverage. When, from the point of
view of the insured, there is coverage from either one of two policies but
for the existence of the other policy, and each contains a provision that is
reasonably subject to a construction that it conflicts with a provision in
the other policy, there is a conflict in the provisions. In the event of a
conflict, Texas courts ignore the conflicting provisions and apportion lia-
bility pro rata between the insurers and require both insurers to
defend. 141
Applying these principles, the court found a conflict between the es-
cape clause in the policy issued by Hartford Underwriters Insurance
Company and the pro rata clause in the policy issued by Royal Insurance
Company of America:
[T]his case appears to be just another permutation of the conflict
explained in Hardware Dealers. Viewed from the perspective of [the
nursing home], the insured, one finds that Hartford provides cover-
age for the underlying suit if Royal's policy did not exist. Similarly,
one sees that Royal provides full coverage for the underlying suit if
Hartford's policy did not exist. A "reasonable construction" of the
two policies from this perspective yields a conflict. 142
The court concluded that both Hartford and Royal were liable propor-
tionally and that both had a duty to defend the nursing home. 143
J. APPRAISAL PROVISIONS
In In re State Farm Lloyds, Inc., a dispute arose concerning the amount
owed by the insurer on the insured's claim for living expenses from the
loss of use of the house due to fire damage.144 The policy provided that if
the insured and insurer failed to agree on the actual cash value, amount
of loss, or cost of repair or replacement, either could make a written de-
mand for appraisal, and it specified the procedures for the appraisal pro-
cess. The insurer sent a letter to the insured invoking the appraisal
provision, but the insured refused to participate in the appraisal process
and filed suit against the insurer for breach of contract. The insurer
moved to enforce the appraisal provision, which the trial court denied.
Rejecting the insured's argument that the insurer waived the appraisal
provision by failing to comply with other policy provisions, the court of
appeals concluded that the trial court's refusal to enforce the appraisal
provision constituted a clear abuse of discretion and granted the insurer
mandamus relief.145
141. Id. at 643 (citing Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 444
S.W.2d 583 (Tex. 1969)).
142. Id. at 644.
143. Id.
144. 170 S.W.3d 629, 630 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2005, orig. proceeding).
145. Id. at 630-31, 633-35. See also In re Clarendon Ins. Co., No. 2-04-305-CV, 2004




In Dr. Michael Hoffman and Associates v. St. Paul Guardian Insurance
Co.,146 the insured filed a claim under its commercial-property insurance
policy for damages to its building from plumbing leaks. While the claim
was pending, the insured sold the buildings to a buyer under a contract
for sale, which provided that if a claim had been made against any insur-
ance carried on the property, the insured would assign any rights that it
had under the policy to the buyer. When the insurer denied the claim,
the buyer, as the insured's assignee, sued the insurer. The policy con-
tained a "non-assignment" provision prohibiting the insured from as-
signing or turning over its interest in the policy without the insurer's
written consent. Emphasizing that non-assignment clauses have been
consistently enforced by Texas courts, the court concluded that because
the evidence conclusively established that the insured never received
written consent from the insurer, the buyer could not pursue the insured's
claims against the insurer.147
L. THE FORTUITY, KNOWN-LOSS, AND LOSS-IN-PROGRESS DOCTRINES
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals reiterated that under Texas
law, fortuity is an inherent requirement of all risk insurance policies.148
The "known loss" and "loss in progress" doctrines are components of the
fortuity doctrine. A "known loss" is a loss that the insured knew had
occurred when it purchased the policy. A "loss in progress" occurs when
the insured is, or should be, aware of an ongoing progressive loss when it
purchased the policy. Insurance coverage is precluded for a "known loss"
or "loss in progress. ' 149 The evidence showed that the insured
homebuilder knew of damage to a few homes when the policy was pur-
chased and in fact, had repaired similar problems on several homes be-
ginning four years earlier. Based on this evidence, the court found that
the insured clearly knew of these losses when it purchased the policy,
even though the insured at that time may not have known the underlying
cause of the problems or the extent of the problems. The court, there-
fore, concluded that these doctrines precluded coverage as a matter of
law for homes that the insured knew of damage or had made repairs
when it purchased the policy.150
(stating that in the absence of waiver, a trial court abuses its discretion and misapplies the
law by refusing to enforce the appraisal provision).
146. No. 05-04-00902-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6500 (Tex. App.-Dallas Aug. 16,
2005, no pet.).
147. Id. at *1-6.
148. Lennar Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., No. 14-02-00860-CV, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS
4214, at *76 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 2, 2005, no pet.).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *77-79. Cf U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gnade, No. 10-03-00289-CV, 2005 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1825, at *8-9 (Tex. App.-Waco Mar. 9, 2005, pet. denied) (declining to apply the
known-loss doctrine because there was no evidence that the additional insured knew about
the accidents, made any incorrect representations, or concealed any information from the
insurer before the insurer's issuance of the additional insured endorsement).
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M. THE MADE-WHOLE DOCrRINE
The Waco Court of Appeals explained that under the "made-whole
doctrine," an insurer is not entitled to subrogation if the insured's loss is
in excess of the amounts recovered from the insurer and the third party
causing the loss.15 ' Thus, if the uncontroverted evidence showed that the
insured's past and future medical expenses exceeded the combined
amount of the settlement that the third parties paid and the health-insur-
ance benefits that the insurer paid, the court concluded that the insured
had not been "made whole," and, therefore, the insurer was not entitled
to recover on its subrogation and reimbursement claims.152
IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. DETERMINING THE DUTY TO INDEMNIFY BY DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT BEFORE A JUDGMENT IN THE UNDERLYING SUIT
The Eastern District of Texas explained that, until recently, the law in
Texas was that courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain a declaratory-judg-
ment action regarding an insurer's duty to indemnify its insured for dam-
ages that could be assessed in a pending lawsuit, as any such
determination was deemed to be dependent on a contingency and purely
advisory in nature. 153 However, the Texas Supreme Court has retreated
from this position, holding that "the duty to indemnify is justiciable
before the insured's liability is determined in the liability lawsuit when
the insurer has no duty to defend and the same reasons that negate the
duty to defend likewise negate any possibility the insurer will ever have a
duty to indemnify."' 154 Thus, if the same reasons that negated the duty to
defend negated any possibility that the insurer would have a duty to in-
demnify, the court ruled in the declaratory-judgment action that the in-
surer had no duty to indemnify the insured for any adverse judgment that
might be rendered in the underlying suit. 155
B. THE LIMITATIONS PERIOD IN A COVERAGE DISPUTE BEGINS ON
THE DATE OF THE INSURER'S DENIAL
In Pace v. Travelers Lloyds of Texas Insurance Co.,156 the insured and
the insurer agreed that the two-year limitations period on the insured's
claims against the insurer began to run upon the denial of the claim, but
disagreed on when that denial occurred. The insurer had sent a letter to
the insured stating:
151. Fortis Benefits v. Cantu, 170 S.W.3d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed).
152. Id. at 758-60.
153. Nat'l Am. Ins. Co. v. Breaux, 368 F. Supp. 2d 604, 615 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
154. Id. at 615-16 (quoting Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81,
83 (Tex. 1997)).
155. Id. at 619.
156. 162 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.).
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After careful consideration of all information available to us, we
have determined that the damage to your property is not afforded
coverage under the insurance policy. ... If you have any additional
information that you feel may have an impact on this coverage deci-
sion or should you have any question concerning this claim please
forward same to me .... 157
The insured argued that the last sentence concerning additional informa-
tion rendered the letter ambiguous as to whether the coverage decision
was final and whether the letter was a denial of coverage. Rejecting this
argument, the court found that the letter plainly stated that the insurer
had determined that coverage was not afforded under the policy, pro-
vided a reason for the decision, reiterated that the insurer would be una-
ble to make a payment, and thus, unequivocally communicated a decision
to deny coverage. Although the final paragraph invited the insured to
provide any additional information that he felt might have an impact on
the decision, the letter did not request any further information, suggest
that any further information would be needed to reach a decision, or oth-
erwise imply that the coverage decision had not been made. Under these
facts, the court concluded that the limitations period began on the date of
this letter. 158
157. Id. at 633.
158. Id. at 634-35.
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